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1. The ill-defined vision of artificial life 
A seductive name is often more confusing than informative to the imagination of the 
general public. Names like “catastrophe theory” and “chaos theory” (not to mention 
“artificial intelligence”) never fail to attract popular attention but rarely direct that 
attention to the substance of their respective disciplines; and serious practitioners often 
wish those names had never been coined in the first place. Now we are confronted with 
“artificial life”, whose origins can be traced back to the late Sixties when John Conway 
began work on his “Game of Life” [ 21. This was simply an array of cellular automata 
whose two states were metaphorically dubbed by Conway “live” and “dead”. Conway 
further pursued his metaphor by explaining the transition rules in terms of “birth”, 
“death”, and “survival”. This metaphor was subsequently picked up by Christopher 
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Langton in the course of his doctoral research at the University of Michigan [ 51: 
Cellular automata provide us with the logical universes within which we can 
embed artificial molecules in the form of propagating, virtual automata. We 
suggest that since virtual automata have the computational capacity to fill many 
of the functional roles played by the primary biomolecules, there is a strong 
possibility that the “molecular logic” of life can be embedded within cellular 
automata and that, therefore, artificial life is a distinct possibility within these 
highly parallel computer structures. 
The paper from which the above quotation was taken, entitled “Studying Artificial 
Life with Cellular Automata”, appeared in the 1986 volume of Physica D; and in 
September of 1987, Langton organized “an interdisciplinary workshop on the synthesis 
and simulation of living systems” at the Center for Nonlinear Studies of the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory. The proceedings of this workshop were published under the title 
ArtiJciaZ Life by the Santa Fe Institute as the sixth volume of their “Studies in the 
Sciences of Complexity”. A second workshop was held in the city of Santa Fe in 
February of 1990; and its proceedings were subsequently published under the same 
auspices as ArtiJcial Life II, along with a two-hour videotape. 
While these workshops have now led to over 1500 pages of published material and two 
hours of video, I think it is fair to say that the discipline has yet to converge upon any 
unifying principles or themes. The workshops have been highly eclectic events, bringing 
together participants from disciplines which were often almost entirely unaware of each 
other. Yet while the resulting diversity is impressive, even the most enthusiastic reader 
cannot help but come away from some of the papers without wondering whether or not 
he has gone beyond the lunatic fringe. 
One source of confusion likely to face the reader is that there are actually quite a 
few things happening in the name of artificial life. Consequently, for the sake of the 
readers of this journal, it will be desirable to sort out those aspects of artificial life 
which are related to artificial intelligence from those which are not. The next section 
will provide a brief review of the latter, where the areas of greatest interest are biology 
and the philosophical study of emergence. This will be followed by a more thorough 
discussion of three aspects of artificial intelligence which have been impacted by artificial 
life research: robotics, implementing Marvin Minsky’s “society of mind” [8], and an 
evolutionary approach to learning. This exposition will be followed by some concluding 
observations. 
2. Aspirations of artificial life (not related to artificial intelligence) 
2.1. Biology 
If one of the objectives of artificial intelligence has been a better understanding of 
what we tend to call “thought”, then one may say that artificial life wishes to take on the 
more general question of life itself. This can be approached from a variety of points of 
view. One is to ask whether or not the manifestations of life on earth are the only such 
S. W Snwliar/Artifcial Intelligence 73 (1995) 371-377 373 
manifestations: Can you have life without the building blocks of carbon, oxygen, and 
hydrogen which are common to all life-forms on this planet? Another is to recognize 
that there are still major lacunae in our understanding of terrestrial biology, many of 
which can not be resolved by conventional experimental practices. Artificial life may 
be viewed as a potential aboratory tool for addressing questions which are beyond the 
grasp of those experimental practices. 
Unfortunately, it may also be viewed as wishful thinking by highly speculative theo- 
retical biologists and camp-followers with limited background in the life sciences. As a 
result there is precious little which would count as “hard science”; and the reader with 
a pedestrian knowledge of biology will be ill-equipped to judge the potential value of 
the “softer” contributions. Fortunately, one of the most concrete presentations i also 
very well written: “ ‘Non-Optimality’ via Pre-adaptation i Simple Neural Systems”, by 
David Stork, Bernie Jackson, and Scott Walker in Artijkial Life II. This paper con- 
fronts the question of apparently “useless” synapses in certain life forms (in this case 
the tailflip circuit in the crayfish). The analysis invokes the principle of co-evolution: 
The circuit is a product of a previous evolutionary stage for which there were differ- 
ent criteria for fitness. However, those fit organisms led to changes in the environment 
which, in turn, led to new fitness criteria to which the organisms were then obliged 
to adapt. Such adaptation was not a matter of “optimizing from scratch” but one of 
seeking a path from a previously optimal state to a new one. Stork and his colleagues 
lucidly demonstrate how such a path could carry along vestigial remains of the previous 
state. 
Most of the other biology papers are far “softer” in content. In his own contribution 
to the second volume, “Life at the Edge of Chaos”, Langton continues his study of 
cellular automata by addressing which sets of state-transition rules are likely to yield 
automata with “life-like” behavioral properties (such as reproduction). However, Lang- 
ton is clearly more at home with thermodynamics than with biology; and he does little 
to convince the reader of the biological implications of his investigation. Similarly, there 
are several papers concerned with the modeling of “autocatalytic sets”, chemical mix- 
tures such as the “primordial soup” [7] which has been hypothesized to be the source 
of life on this planet; but none of those models can yet explain the presence of the 
molecules common to terrestrial life forms (such as RNA). 
2.2. “Philosophy/emergence” 
An aspect of the second volume of proceedings which was not present in the first was 
that of philosophical speculation. Two papers were products of a panel discussion on the 
“Ontology of Artificial Life”: “Aspects of Information, Life, Reality, and Physics”, by 
Steen Rasmussen, and “Emergence and Artificial Life”, by Peter Cariani. Rasmussen’s 
presentation was extremely sketchy; but it is important o note his observation that 
“physics also gives rise to chemistry and biology, and through them, an observer par- 
ticipation, namely the emergence of life and later the evolution of man” (p. 769). This 
reduction of biology to physics was contested in Robert Rosen’s paper, “What Does 
It Take to Make an Organism?’ It is unfortunate that this opposing position never ap- 
peared in print. Cariani’s paper, on the other hand, is more valuable for its expository 
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discussion of three approaches to emergence: computational emergence, thermodynamic 
emergence, and emergence relative to a model. This analysis is potentially valuable in 
that it raises the possibility that studies which are concerned with computational emer- 
gence (such as Langton’s work with cellular automata) may not necessarily impact 
the physical phenomena of thermodynamic emergence, which include the origin of life. 
However, it would be a mistake to view Cariani as a defeatist. Rather, his philosophical 
analysis clearly illustrates a need for focus which is sorely lacking in the biological 
contributions to these two volumes. 
3. Artificial life and artificial intelligence 
3.1. Robotics 
From the perspective of artificial intelligence, robots are the most viable examples of 
artificial life, particularly those which are androids or emulations of other animal life 
forms. The second workshop featured a presentation by Rod Brooks with the humble 
title, “Real Artificial Life”. Much of the substance of this talk can be found in Brooks’ 
paper, “Intelligence without Representation”, which has been published in this journal 
[ 31. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that some statement of these results did not appear 
in Arti$cial Life II. 
3.2. Implementing the Society of Mind 
One of the more perplexing editorial decisions of the first proceedings volume was 
the allocation of an explicit section to reports on projects at the MIT Media Lab. While 
the association between artificial life and media studies seemed tenuous at best, this 
decision resulted in the publication of one of the most interesting papers in the entire 
two volumes of proceedings: “Animal Construction Kits”, by Michael Travers. The 
name of the paper, itself, should justify its relevance to artificial life. What is important 
for purposes of this review, however, is its contribution to artificial intelligence: This 
paper constitutes an excellent account of an implementation of a system based on the 
principles outlined in Minsky’s book, The Society of Mind [ 81. One reason for Travers’ 
success may be that he is building upon the same foundation that inspired Minsky, 
Nikolaas Tinbergen’s pioneering study of animal instinct [ lo]. 
Travers’ system is called Agar, and it was developed as part of the work on the Vivar- 
ium Project at the Media Lab. Its long-term goal is to model the three-spined stickleback 
which Tinbergen had studied extensively. However, one of the more important contri- 
butions of Agar is the recognition that an effective implementation of a creature like 
the stickleback cannot be achieved unless one also implements a realistic world which 
it can inhabit. Thus, Travers’ success can be attributed, at least in part, to his ability to 
come up with a suitable implementation scale for both his artificial creatures and the 
world in which they exist. 
Travers summarizes the implementation of his creatures as follows: 
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An Agar creature’s behavioral control system is made up of entities called agents, 
loosely based on those described in Minsky’s Society of Mind theory [ 81. In 
Agar’s implementation of the theory, agents are computational objects that can: 
l Execute concurrently, 
l Maintain local state, 
l Access the state of other agents through connections, and 
l Take actions automatically when environmental conditions are met. 
An agent is to be thought of as semi-autonomous. This means that an agent is 
not necessarily doing the bidding of some other agent or outside entity such as 
the user, but is responding to conditions in its environment, which can include 
other agents as well as the world. In this sense, an agent is similar to a production 
rule. 
An agent’s condition can be stated as a boolean function of sensor predicates 
and other agents’ activations. An agent’s action can be an arbitrary behavior 
expressible in Lisp. . . . 
Actions that an agent may want to perform include: 
l Activate or suppress other agents, 
l Activate a motor function, 
l Activate a script, 
l Remember the current activation state of other agents (K-line creation . . .), 
and 
l Create a new agent or alter an existing one. (p. 429) 
Agar was subsequently demonstrated during the second workshop. However, no pa- 
per was presented; and there was no follow-up document in the proceedings vol- 
ume. 
3.3. Learning and evolution 
A major theme of the second workshop which was virtually ignored during the first 
workshop concerned the application of principles of evolution to learning. Five excellent 
papers were delivered during the workshop, all of which appeared in the proceedings 
volume along with some papers which had their origins as posters. Because these results 
are of particular interest to current work in artificial intelligence, I shall summarize 
several of the more interesting of these contributions. 
“Interactions between Learning and Evolution”, by David Ackley and Michael 
Littman, addresses a very fundamental question of survival: 
How can an organism learn in . . . circumstances, where the only unarguable sign 
of failure is the organism’s own death, and the reproduction process preserves 
only the genetic information, which is unaffected by any learning performed 
during the organism’s life? (p. 489) 
To answer this question, Ackley and Littman propose a new approach to learning 
algorithms: 
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“Evolutionary Reinforcement Learning” [ 11 (ERL) provides one answer to this 
question. In ERL, we allow evolution to specify not only inherited behaviors, but 
also inherited goals that are used to guide learning. We do this by constructing a 
genetic code that specifies two major components. The first component is a set 
of initial values for the weights of an “action network” that maps from sensory 
input to behavior. These weights represent an innate set of behaviors that the 
individual inherits directly from its parents. 
The second component is an “evaluation network” that maps from sensory 
input to a scalar value representing the “goodness” of the current situation. 
By learning to move from “bad” situations to “better” situations-modifying 
its action network weights in the process-an individual achieves the goals of 
learning passed down from its predecessors. Whether those inherited goals are 
actually sensible or not is, of course, a separate issue; insofar as learning is a 
factor, each organism stakes its life on the assumption that its inherited evaluation 
function is reliable. (p. 489) 
The idea of a genetic code which governs not only an organism’s “behavioral hard- 
ware” but also the goals it has which must be satisfied through behavior places this 
work very much in sympathy with Tinbergen’s perception of instinct and Minsky’s in- 
terpretation of Tinbergen’s work. Indeed, the relationship between behavior and goals 
is one of the more neglected areas in the current “Neural Darwinism” work of Gerald 
Edelman and his colleagues [9]. Ackley and Littman have presented a bold piece of 
experimental work, supplemented by an excellent display of results incorporated in the 
video proceedings. 
The artificial life team at UCLA is represented by several papers, the most interesting 
of which is “AntFarm: Towards Simulated Evolution”, by Robert Collins and David Jef- 
ferson. The project is basically concerned with the study of a colony of artificial “ants”. 
The issues are “simulated evolution of complex behavior in complex environments, the 
evolution of cooperation among closely related individuals, and the evolution of chemi- 
cal communication” (p. 579). Of greatest interest is the extent to which this work has 
been guided by attempts to model the actual behaviors observed in ant colonies. 
Communication receives more specific examination in another UCLA paper by Gre- 
gory Werner and Michael Dyer, “Evolution of Communication in Artificial Organisms”. 
Werner and Dyer populate a world with artificial male and female organisms in order 
to investigate the evolution of mate-finding strategies. Not only do effective strategies 
emerge from their model; but also subspecies develop which communicate through dif- 
ferent “dialects”. While Collins and Jefferson began from the position of observing life 
and trying to explain the behavior they saw, Werner and Dyer have explored a particular 
objective of life which may ultimately provide new ways of looking at the “real thing”. 
4. Conclusions 
The “bottom line”, then, is that there is much of substance in these volumes which 
may interest members of the artificial intelligence community. There is also much to 
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encourage wild speculation, and whether or not any of that speculation may ultimately 
benefit the study of artificial intelligence remains to be seen. Resources such as the 
published work of Edelman [4] seem to offer evidence that the time is ripe for a more 
fruitful interaction between artificial intelligence and biology. However, on the basis of 
these two volumes, it is unclear that “artificial life” will provide a foundation for that 
interaction. Furthermore, because these volumes have been relatively poorly edited, they 
do not provide a particularly good introduction to the literature for readers who might 
wish to learn more about potentially relevant biological issues. Perhaps this means that 
the time is not yet quite right for artificial intelligence to turn to biology for inspiration. 
For now, unless the next workshop brings a bit more focus to the discipline of artificial 
life, its impact on artificial intelligence is likely to be rather peripheral. 
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